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The environment is so rich with information that our cognitive system would be
overloaded without a way to evaluate what is relevant for our needs and goals. Appraisal
theory has shown how emotions, by “tagging” the environment with differential values,
enable the attribution of our attentional resources to what is most relevant in any
given circumstances. Most often, however, the different cues triggering the allocation
of attention are thought of as purely individualistic, like physiological needs or past
encounters with certain stimuli. This approach is perfectly appropriate for objects,
organisms or events that, by their intrinsic properties, affect the organism’s well being.
But for humans, many aspects of the environment are culturally or temporally dependent:
a soccer game may be highly relevant to some, but not at all to others. This paper
contributes to a better understanding of the processes by which different elements
of our social environment acquire value through our socialization process. We recruit
different concepts proposed by developmental psychologists to shed some light on this
social acquisition of relevance. The notion of “joint attention,” for example, is particularly
important to understand how we are sensitive to the other’s focus of attention. Similarly,
the term “social referencing” has been used to describe the process of taking into account
the affective reaction to a given stimuli, in order to direct our behavior. At the core of this
process, called “social appraisal” by Manstead, we propose that a specific emotion plays a
major role: interest. Someone else’s expression of interest, which seems to be detectable
from a very early age, is extremely useful in gauging what is worthy of attention among
stimuli that are not inherently interesting. The paper highlights how external sources of
information (the life experiences of community members) indicate what is relevant, thus
giving access to the social values of that group.
Keywords: appraisal theory, interest, social appraisal, social values, social learning
INTRODUCTION
In the long empiricist tradition that characterizes the Western
conception of humankind, our inner experience of the world
results from successive perceptual contacts with our biological,
physical and social environment. In this context, it is hard from
a developmental perspective not to think of a baby’s mental life
as “one great blooming, buzzing confusion,” (James, 1890/1981,
p. 462). How could it be otherwise in a world of objects and events
that overlap and coincide in so many ways? Many of the recent
breakthroughs in developmental psychology have been aimed at
understanding the relative placidity of babies confronted with
a plethora of information that they in fact, master impressively
quickly. Everything happens as if babies were naturally equipped
for such “cognitive digestion,” either because they can rely on
some evolutionary modules to make sense of the information
due to some core knowledge—naive physics, biology, psychol-
ogy, or even sociology (Baillargeon, 1994; Wellman and Woolley,
1990; Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994; Spelke, 1994; Xu and Carey,
1996), or because they rely on powerful “pattern detectors” which
enable them to detect correlations and forge hypotheses about the
structure of the world (Gopnik, 2010).
These cognitive predispositions, however, are just part of the
solution. Even if we imagine that babies are equipped to process
in specific ways, how can they assess which information should
be processed at any given time? Without a system enabling them
to prioritize how to distribute their cognitive powers, the risk of
behavioral paralysis is too high.
Appraisal theory provides a possible answer since it describes
how not all stimuli are equal to our cognitive system, and how
our emotions play the role of “radar antennae scanning the envi-
ronment,” (Scherer, 1994, p. 230). This relative saliency in our
environment can be due to the fact that, given our organism’s
needs, certain stimuli have a high biological significance and
are therefore automatically prioritized by the attentional system
(Brosch et al., 2007). For instance, when hungry, the value of food
is very high and priority is given to any process leading to the sat-
isfying of this biological need. Other factors are more personal
and depend on the individual’s history: a given odor or taste for
instance, can mobilize a person’s attention because it reminds her
of a special time with her grandmother. Finally, certain elements
of our environment are socially relevant because they are consid-
ered as important for the members of the individual’s reference
group. In certain communities for example, a soccer World Cup
Final will thus be lived as though it is a religious ritual, whereas
in others, it will be ignored. For all these values, the amygdala
seems to play an essential role in filtering what is relevant to the
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organism, and an event is relevant if it can “significantly influ-
ence (positively or negatively) the attainment of his or her goals,
the satisfaction of his or her needs, the maintenance of his or her
own well-being, and the well-being of his or her species” (Sander
et al., 2003, p. 311).
In this paper, we will focus on social relevance and, more
specifically, on how socio-cultural values pass from socialized
to newly arrived social members, i.e., babies. After a brief sum-
mary of the component process model (CPM) proposed by Klaus
Scherer to describe how we appraise incoming stimuli, we will
concentrate on a dimension of the model that has not been given
much attention: normative significance. By specifying the nature
of this check, we will propose that recent attempts to describe
social appraisal are particularly relevant to this topic. More specif-
ically, we will show how the emotion of interest can be essential
for the baby to discern what is valued in his or her social envi-
ronment when it is displayed by significant others. To specify
the competences required for “using” expressed interest to detect
what is socially relevant, we will revisit three important notions
that underlie the way infants can be influenced by others in
their development: joint attention, social referencing and social
appraisal. Consequences for the study of the role of interest will
then be discussed.
THE SOCIAL SIDE OF APPRAISAL
Nowadays, the CPM is one of the most complex, empirically
supported and heuristic models of emotion processing (Scherer,
1984, 2001; Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003). In this model, emotions
are regarded as psychological episodes that have a felt charac-
ter and are evaluative of particular objects (Deonna and Teroni,
2012). Its central idea is that emotions play a key role in the
way our brains scan the environment and prepare our organism
for action (Leventhal and Scherer, 1987). This evaluation is per-
formed by a series of different checks that occur in a sequential
order—Stimulus Evaluation Checks (SEC). Everything happens
as if the emotional processes respond to the following questions:
“(a) How relevant is this event for me? Does it directly affect me
or my social reference group? (relevance); (b) What are the impli-
cations or consequences of this event and how do they affect my
well-being and my immediate or long-term goals? (implications);
(c) How well can I cope with or adjust to these consequences?
(coping potential); (d) What is the significance of this event for
my self-concept and for social norms and values? (normative
significance)” (Scherer, 2009, p. 1309). These checks, that often
occur automatically, unconsciously and effortlessly, are supposed
to follow this order.
In this model, relevance detection plays an essential role
because it is considered to be a first selective filter that a stim-
ulus or event needs to pass through in order to merit further
processing (Sander et al., 2005, p. 322). However, the role played
by social factors at this stage remains unclear. On the one hand,
the significance of the stimulus or the event with respect to social
norms and values is clearly relegated to one of the final evalua-
tion checks. It consists in checking the compatibility with external
standards: social norms, values, beliefs about justice, or moral
principles (Scherer, 2009, p. 1313). By definition, it requires high-
level and comprehensive information, and even “comparison
with high-level propositional representation” (Sander et al., 2005,
p. 322). On the other hand, the social nature of the relevance pro-
cess is acknowledged: relevance is about how a given event affects
oneself or one’s social reference group (Sander et al., 2005, p. 319).
Indeed, the role of social context in appraisal has been highlighted
by recent work underlining, in the CPM perspective, the role
played by the amygdala for relevance. Sander et al. (2003) sug-
gested that the human amygdala works as a “relevance detector”
and is activated in presence of social signals such as gaze direction,
intentions, group adherence, trustworthiness and facial familiar-
ity. Other works have highlighted the role played by the amygdala
when individuals have to evaluate trustworthiness in their social
exchanges (Adolphs et al., 1998;Winston et al., 2002; Todorov and
Engell, 2008). Given the rapidity of these relevance detection pro-
cesses driven by the amygdala (Vuilleumier, 2005; Brosch et al.,
2008), one can therefore conclude that at least a part of what is
social in the CMP does not need reflexive and/or propositional
processes.
If the processing of another person’s facial or bodily expres-
sions triggers the amygdala, especially when the person is looking
directly at you (Conty and Grèzes, 2012), it is unlikely that these
intersubjective situations are the only way that appraisal pro-
cesses are influenced by the “social.” Indeed, relevance is evaluated
according to the significance events have for what is valued by
the organism. Certain stimuli have high biological significance
and are automatically prioritized by the attention system (Brosch
et al., 2007), while others trigger specific evaluations of the envi-
ronment as a result of personal needs and values (Ellsworth and
Scherer, 2003). Social relevance aims precisely at understanding
how these personal values are shaped during the development of
a person. Admittedly, values do not emerge in a social void. On
the contrary, children most likely develop a certain number of
their personal preferences and values as a result of the contact
they have with their social referents (parents, friends, teachers,
coach, etc.). Once this transmission period ends, specific parts
of their environment will more or less automatically trigger their
attention and interest. For a child born into a family of cyclists,
for instance, a champion like Eddy Merckx would be immedi-
ately detected in a crowd and this episode would be remembered
forever, while on the contrary, the cyclists’ hero would stay unno-
ticed by a family of soccer players. Therefore, depending on the
“attentional” priorities of their social milieu, an individual’s envi-
ronment tends to be colored by different “social lenses” that will
render certain elements of the world as valuable and worthy of
attention, at the same time sentencing the others to indifference
and invisibility.
Therefore, it seems very important (even from a psychological
point of view) to understand how values, inherent in a given form
of life (Clément, 1996), pervade our appraisal system, to the point
that it can influence the very beginning of the SEC. As the follow-
ing section will show, developmental psychology appears to offer
some indications.
ATTENDING TO OTHERS
In many senses, the human species is fundamentally a
social species. As the anthropologist Clifford Geertz wrote:
“human behavior is so loosely determined by intrinsic sources
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of information that extrinsic sources are so vital” (Geertz,
1973/1993, p. 93). Even if not credulous, children learn most
of what they know via others’ testimony (Clément et al., 2004;
Clément, 2010). Moreover, the human species is fundamentally
altricial: offspring are highly dependent on others for a very long
period of time. It is therefore not very surprising that other peo-
ple’s appraisal systems can influence one’s own evaluation of
events and stimuli.
From a cognitive perspective, newborns seem to be “prewired”
for attending to human-like faces (Johnson et al., 1991; Heron-
Delaney et al., 2011). This preference may well be due to the
fact that there is an evolutionary advantage for babies in treat-
ing other human faces as particularly relevant to making sense
of their surroundings, given their richness as a source of infor-
mation. Furthermore, from an early age, babies are increasingly
able to follow someone else’s gaze (Scaife and Bruner, 1975). For
instance, 2–5-day-old newborns can discriminate between direct
and averted gaze, and 4-month-old infants’ brain activity shows
specific neural activity when presented with faces with direct
(as opposed to averted) eye gaze (Farroni et al., 2002). A few
months later, evidence begins to emerge that infants start look-
ing at the world via others’ perspectives. At 12 months, infants
are able to detect selective attention when an adult looks at sev-
eral things but attends only to some part of them (Tomasello and
Haberl, 2003). This capacity, called joint attention, plays a cru-
cial role in development, notably in language learning. Indeed,
it is thanks to joint attention that caregivers and infants can
establish what is being referenced, and learn that certain sounds
match with objects, persons or events in the shared environment
(Tomasello, 2003). From a perceptual point of view, it is therefore
very likely that infants are prone to select their objects of atten-
tion, at least partially, by aligning their own attention with others’
attention.
Beside the ability to take into account others’ objects of inter-
est and to be driven to be attentive to the same objects, babies
around that age (the end of their first year) start to move around
on their own, and they gain new ways of feeding their appetite
for exploration. Facing all kinds of new objects, they have ever
more opportunities to create mischief. Fortunately perhaps, it
is also at this age that they start to rely more on their care-
givers’ cues (facial expressions, body language and tone of voice)
to appraise ambiguous and new events (Klinnert et al., 1986).
As Feinman and Lewis (1983) put it, caregivers serve from now
on not only as a base of security but also as a base of informa-
tion. Such social information gathering “is rooted in the ability
to appreciate that another individual can function as a conduit
for information about the world” (Baldwin and Moses, 1996,
p. 1917). In the famous visual cliff experiment, infants dared
to crawl over a simulated cliff when the mothers expressed joy
or interest (Sorce et al., 1985). This ability that the infant has
to disambiguate the emotional meaning of objects in the envi-
ronment by actively seeking out emotional information from
significant others (Hertenstein and Campos, 2004) has been
called social referencing. It is important to highlight the fact that,
contrary to joint attention where infants’ focus of attention is
driven by another’s gaze direction, the object of concern for
social referencing pre-exists in the infant’s conscious field. In a
way, the child has already evaluated the object as relevant, and
the social information she obtains is essentially used to mod-
ulate her behavior toward that object. We propose therefore, a
slightly less inclusive definition than Feinman and Lewis (1983,
p. 878), who define social referencing as the use of one’s per-
ception of someone else’s interpretations of a situation to form
one’s own understanding of that situation. We agree more read-
ily with Pelaez et al.’s (2012) definition of social referencing
as “a behavior chain in which the presence of an ambiguous
object or event signals the gaze shift of an infant toward another
person, typically the mother, whose facial, vocal, and gestural
expressions may then serve as discriminative stimuli for a sub-
sequent approach response” (p.23). We therefore endorse the
view that social referencing directs behavior, rather than forms
an understanding.
In contrast to the aforementioned cases, there are situations
where the focus of a given object or event does not pre-exist the
social interaction, or when the evaluation of the object itself is
modified by the nature of the social information. Children, for
instance, can be intrigued by the way adults are captivated and
excited by a soccer game on television (Demers et al., 2013);
in those families, we can expect children to be sensitive to
future soccer related events. On the contrary, the appraisal that
underlies an activity like stuffing oneself with ice cream can be
modified by a strong and negative emotional parental reaction.
Even occurrent emotional reactions triggered by an individual
appraisal, for instance, bursting out laughing when seeing an
old man stumbling in a bus, can be re-evaluated once the emo-
tional reactions of the other, disapproving witnesses are taken
into consideration (Jakobs et al., 1997). To refer to these cases
where the value of events or objects are modified by the obser-
vation of other people’s emotional reactions, Manstead and his
colleagues (Manstead and Fischer, 2001; Evers et al., 2005) have
proposed the concept of social appraisal. One of Manstead’s
objectives is to highlight the fact that most appraisal theorists
tended to favor research that focuses on relatively socially iso-
lated individuals, and on values that are essentially independent
from the socio-cultural environment. In contrast, social appraisal
highlights the fact that “the behaviors, thoughts or feelings of
one or more other persons are often appraised in addition to
the appraisal of the event per se” (Manstead and Fischer, 2001,
p. 222).
Social appraisal can be expected to play a considerable part in a
child’s socialization, given that there are many events and objects
in our social environment that are not relevant in terms of their
intrinsic properties, and the fact our social environment is full
of objects that arouse considerable interest for certain groups of
people, but not to others.
It is only via others’ appraisal that the relevance of a particular
artistic form, sport, hobby, political engagement, or environ-
mental consciousness becomes salient for the children. However,
while there is an abundance of developmental research on joint
attention and social referencing, the role of social appraisal has
not really been identified in infancy. Compared to social refer-
encing, where others’ emotions seem to play a regulatory role
in the expression of a behavior by encouraging or discourag-
ing the on-going action, it is most likely that social appraisal
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necessitates a much finer understanding of the expressed emo-
tion. To play the role of relevancy detectors, others’ faces have
to be “read” by the children: only a rather subtle interpreta-
tion of others’ appraisal can help them to detect if an object
or event is worthy of attention, on a scale going from “abhor-
rent” to “highly desirable.” In this context, we hypothesize that
certain expressed emotions play an essential role by “tagging”
certain stimuli with a given emotional valence for the chil-
dren. Such a transmission of values can be intentional and
explicit: parents, for instance, may find that is very important
to transmit their love of the arts, or the virtue of politeness, to
their heirs. In these cases, parents may resort to what Gergerly
and Csibra call natural pedagogy with ostensive communica-
tion to indicate new and relevant information (Gergely and
Csibra, 2006; Csibra and Gergely, 2009). It has been shown in
such pedagogical contexts that mothers adapt their voice and
speech when talking to young children, speaking “motherese”
(Snow, 1972). More generally, adults also modify their move-
ments when interacting with infants such that their actions
simultaneously enhance infant’s attention and highlight mean-
ingful units within the flow of motion (Brand et al., 2002).
More specifically, when mothers show objects to young chil-
dren, relative to showing them to other adults, their actions
are notably characterized by closer proximity to the partner,
greater enthusiasm, a larger range of motion, greater repeti-
tiveness, longer gazes, more turn-taking and greater simplifi-
cation (Brand et al., 2007). However, we argue that not all
social transmissions of values rely on such ostensive cues. By
observing others, children (and adults) can detect what cap-
tures their attention or, on the contrary, what they disregard:
an expression of awe or an expression full of scorn, even
expressed by an anonymous by-stander, can still be very socially
relevant.
For this third-party influence in the ontogenesis of social rele-
vance, we suppose that certain expressed emotions will play an
essential role, notably disgust, contempt, and interest. We will
focus here on interest because (1) it is an emotion that has not
yet been extensively studied, (2) it should indicate to an observer
what another person appraises as being “worthy of interest”, i.e.,
as relevant. Interest is therefore an emotion of crucial importance
for social appraisal.
THE ROLE OF INTEREST
Given the scope of this paper, we cannot discuss here all the
aspects of interest (but see Silvia, 2006). Briefly, interest is the
emotion associated with curiosity, exploration, and information
seeking (Tomkins, 1962; Berlyne, 1966; Izard, 2009). According
to Silvia, interest as a felt emotion consists of appraisals of novelty
(factors related to the unfamiliarity and complexity of an object
or event) and appraisals of coping potential (the ability to under-
stand the new object or event) (Silvia, 2005). Its function is to
motivate seeking behaviors, learning and exploration (Panksepp,
2005; Silvia, 2008). One of the important questions in studying
interest concerns the existence of a specific expression of interest.
This aspect is especially important given our problematic: social
appraisal could not take place without cues that enable children
to detect others’ interest.
The expression of interest has apparently no place among
the most renowned and widely used basic emotion stimuli that
Ekman considered as universal: happiness, sadness, anger, fear,
disgust, and surprise (Ekman and Friesen, 1971). Actually, it
appears from later research that Ekman had considered includ-
ing both “interest” and “contempt” in the series, but presum-
ably he was unable to find suitable static photographs (Ekman,
1992, 1993). However, even if “momentary expressions” are
particularly efficient from an evolutionary perspective, Ekman
did not deny the important role that “extended expressions”
might play (Ekman, 1993). Interest seems precisely to be one of
these extended emotions and it is therefore not surprising that
even adults cannot recognize static stimuli of interest. This was
first identified in a 1964 study where interest was one of eight
expressions presented to participants (neutrality, surprise, dis-
tress, enjoyment, fear, anger, disgust, shame, and interest) and
where interest was only more frequently recognized than surprise
(Tomkins and Mc Carter, 1964). Interestingly, Tomkins and Mc
Carter report that the actors they had hired to pose the expres-
sions complained particularly about how difficult it was to pose
“interest.” We had a similar difficulty with the actors that were
hired for a study we are currently conducting with adults, as if
playing a static interest, contrary to a dynamic one, was impossi-
ble. In our experiment, participants are asked to watch pictures or
movies and to recognize the staged emotions based on Ekman’s
basic expressions, including a neutral/calm expression and the
expression of interest. Static headshots are not well recognized
for interest, particularly when compared to six-second films of
dynamic headshots and dynamic whole body shots (Dukes et al.,
in preparation). Similar results were found in another study in
which four positive emotions (pride, pleasure, joy, and interest)
were compared (Mortillaro et al., 2011). Facial expressions of
each emotion were taken from the Geneva Multimodal Emotion
Portrayal corpus in which each actor was asked to express each
emotion several times [see Bänzinger et al. (2012) for details].
Representative facial expressions were then coded using the Facial
Action Coding System (FACS). While the four positive emotions
could not be differentiated on the basis of the presence or absence
of particular Actions Units (AU), they could be differentiated
in terms of their temporal dynamics—the sequence and timing
of the unfolding expression [see Krumhuber et al. (2013) for a
review of the dynamics of facially expressed affect].
From the perspective of studying the role of expressed interest
in the ontogenesis of social appraisal, it will therefore be essen-
tial to expose infants to dynamic stimuli. The other important
point to be assessed is the “contagion” of the interest. In other
words, does the observation of someone being interested by an
object cause children to also appraise this object with interest?
One of the dimensions is behavioral. As interest is the emo-
tion that underlies curiosity, seeking and exploratory behaviors
are expected toward an object that has been considered with
interest by a third-party. A more subtle behavioral dimension
is eye gaze pattern: by using an eye-tracker, it should be pos-
sible to detect whether an object of someone’s interest triggers
more curiosity and becomes more visually explored by the par-
ticipant. Another dimension is the transmission of the emotion
itself: when an infant sees a person being interested in something,
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 349 | 4
Clément and Dukes Interest and transmission of values
will he/she start being interested in the same object? Such an
inquiry is rather complicated because one has to identify on
babies’ faces the signs of interest. Actually, several early studies
have described the facial expression of interest in babies. One such
study argued that babies as young as 9months were able to express
interest (Izard, 1980), while another study suggested that infants
may facially signal emotions, including interest (Oster, 1978). A
further study described several facial movements as indicative
of an expression of interest, such as brows raised, brows knit,
eyes widened and rounded, eyes squinted, cheeks raised, mouth
opened and relaxed, tongue moved, lips pursed [(Izard, 1979);
Izard, as cited in Langsdorf et al. (1983)]. Using these indica-
tions, Langsdorf et al. (1983) showed that facial expressions of
interest predicted the time that the infants spent viewing human
or inanimate objects while Izard et al. (1995) show that expres-
sions of interest were morphologically stable between the ages
of 2.5 and 9 months. Another important facet of the expression
of interest appears to be the “body stilling and facial sobering”
(Camras et al., 2002) or “freezing” (Scherer et al., 2004) that char-
acterizes a reaction to a novel stimulus: the whole body and facial
expression remains motionless for a moment after the stimulus
becomes known. It has been argued that freezing is a normal reac-
tion to an ambiguous situation, as the person is unsure how to
react, and that this is more likely to occur in very young infants
who “do not yet have the necessary cognitive mechanisms (nor
the stored experiences) to conclusively appraise highly unusual
events and to prepare appropriate action tendencies” (Scherer
et al., 2004, p. 399). It is as if the organism is “buying time” to
disambiguate the situation before reacting. Of course, the impor-
tance that freezing may play in an expression of interest shows
again why interest might be more recognizable when presented
dynamically.
By putting together what we currently know about (a) the
way interest is expressed and (b) the different cues indicating
that infants are experiencing the emotion of interest (behavior,
eye gaze patterns, and felt interest), it is possible to conceive
of studies that seek to understand when and how children are
able to take into account the attentional parsing of the environ-
ment performed by their caregivers. Given that joint attention
is assumed to emerge around the age of 12 months (Carpenter
et al., 1998; Moll and Tomasello, 2004), we suspect that this abil-
ity emerges during the second year. Furthermore, as children
have been shown to learn a lot about their social environment by
observation alone (Rogoff, 2003), it is likely that this third-party
appraisal does not require any ostensive signals from the adults in
order to be accomplished.
CONCLUSION
The main objective of this paper was to consider more care-
fully the role played by others in the determination of what is
relevant in our surrounding. Apart from some very basic bio-
logical values, most of the objects, events, and phenomena we
consider as worthy of investment in time, energy or resources, we
in fact inherit from our social and cultural environment. It seems
therefore important to study, in an appraisal theory perspective,
the last step of the SEC proposed by Klaus Scherer: normative
significance.
Our feeling is that, via social information gathered by children
from very early on, norms and values are so deeply embedded in
the appraisal process that even the first evaluation check—how
relevant is this event for me?—is marked by the social history of
the individuals.
When scanning the environment, some objects or events seem
more salient than others. These objects/events are often more
salient because they are relevant to the individual’s goals. We have
shown the importance of an individual’s life experience in the
detection of what is relevant and therefore their “choice” of object
about which they will appraise. This does not mean that this
experience has not been tainted by numerous encounters with sig-
nificant others who shared, explicitly or not, what they considered
as interesting, appalling, or insignificant. But, at a given time, all
these life experiences can act as an internal source of information
when appraising an event. In other situations, the importance of
the third person’s perspective can be brought to the forefront in
the appraisal process: in this case, it is some external source of
information (the life experience of another person) that will influ-
ence the appraisal. Clearly, this third person directs her attention
as a consequence of her own life experiences and values, which
again were elaborated in contact with others. When these multi-
ple social appraisals happen in a relatively interconnected circle,
nothing less than a culture is transmitted and perpetuated.
To study the very beginning of this cultural process and to
prepare the ground for experimental studies with infants, we pro-
posed a conceptual gradation in the way children take advantage
of social information in the early stages of their development.
From a perceptual point of view, babies are sensitive to oth-
ers’ direction of gaze. At the end of their first year, they can
detect others’ selective attention and join their own attention
to those of their caregivers—joint attention. From a behavioral
point of view, they can, at around the same period, actively seek
emotional information from significant others to modulate their
own behavior—social referencing. Eventually, most likely in the
second year, infants are able to take into consideration an emo-
tion expressed by another person to appraise an event, object or
person—social appraisal.
The emotion of interest appears to be particularly relevant for
studying the onset and development of social appraisal by chil-
dren. In expressing interest, adults offer important cues about
what is salient for them in their environment. We hypothesize that
every expression of interest that children can detect on an adult’s
face and body, enables them to “tag” their environment with dif-
ferent levels of saliency. Social appraisal plays therefore a crucial
role for children: it enables them to enter a given society by gain-
ing access to the values that are essential to the members of their
reference groups.
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